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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to empirically investigate which exchange rate 
arrangements are associated with more speculative attacks in the foreign 
exchange market, a relationship which is estimated using a least squares 
dummy variables panel data model. Also, this article addresses the issue of 
measurement errors in the classification of exchange rate regimes by using 
four different classification schemes. Three de facto and one de jure 
classifications are used. Consequently, the sensitivity of these results to 
alternative exchange rate classifications is also tested. The empirical findings 
indicate clear support for fixed regimes particularly in emerging and 
developing countries. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the early 70s, speculative attacks on the currency markets have become more 
common than people usually imagine. Currency crisis and speculative attacks are used almost 
synonymously, but really a speculative attack on government reserves may or may not result in 
a currency crisis. It depends on the ability or willingness of the government to defend the national 
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currency. In this context, a currency crisis happens when the government cannot (or does not 
want to) support the exchange rate. However, some researchers argue that certain exchange 
rate regimes are more prone to speculative attacks. In that sense, interest in speculative attacks 
and exchange rate crisis has led to the development of a body of literature analyzing this 
phenomenon. Contrary to a large number of studies in the literature, relatively few studies 
attempt to empirically investigate the relationship between exchange rate regime and exchange 
market pressure or speculative attacks in developed, emerging and developing countries, 
separately. This is perhaps, because such an empirical investigation is fraught with difficulties, 
including the problem concerning the classification of exchange arrangement.  
This article addresses the issue of measurement errors in the classification of exchange 
rate regimes by using four different classification schemes. Three de facto and one de jure 
classifications are used. Consequently, the sensitivity of these results to alternative exchange 
rate classifications is also tested. The principal conclusions emerging from this study are the 
following: emerging and developing countries adopting fixed exchange rate arrangements 
experience lower foreign exchange market pressure or speculative attacks.  
The remainder of this article is organised in the following way: Section 2 presents a brief 
literature review focusing on exchange arrangement classifications and on the link between 
exchange rate regimes and speculative attacks. Section 3 discusses the issues of exchange 
market pressure indicators. Section 4 describes the empirical framework. A preliminary analysis 
of the data is presented in Section 5. Section 6 reports empirical findings. Section 7 concludes 
the findings of this article. 
2 Exchange Rate Regimes and Speculative Attacks: A Survey 
of the Literature 
This literature review section is broken down into two sub-sections. The first sub-section 
constitutes a brief discussion on the different approaches, considered in this study; to exchange 
rate regime classification is presented. The second sub-section presents a review of empirical 
analyses of exchange arrangements and speculative attacks.  
 
2.1 Regime Classification 
A common problem in the empirical analysis of exchange rate systems is regime 
classification. The literature identifies two approaches to this problem: the de jure classification 
and the de facto classification. The former classifies countries by what they say they do (de jure). 
However, countries often act differently to what they declare they do. In particular, a self-declared 
independent floating regime, in reality, often operates a managed peg regime. This phenomenon 
of operating a disguised peg is referred to as "fear of floating" (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
Classifying countries by what they actually do is a de facto classification. Some authors develop 
de facto classifications using various methods (Ghosh et al., 1997; Bailliu et al., 2001; Moreno, 
2001; Poirson, 2002; Bubula and Otker-Rober, 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Shambaugh, 
2004; Dubas et al., 2005; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger, 2005; Bérnassy-Quéré et al., 2006; 
Frankel and Wei, 2008; Klein and Shambaugh, 2008; Ilzetski et al., 2010), but these are 
fundamentally based on data on the behaviour of nominal exchange rates, international 
reserves and interest rates2. 
                                               
2 To a literature reviews on why many countries follow de facto regimes different from their de jure regimes see Cruz-
Rodríguez (2013). 
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Some empirical studies simply employ the de facto classification because the de jure 
classification may reach incorrect results3, particularly about floating regimes. On the other hand, 
some research employs the de jure classification arguing that it suffers from less drawbacks 
than the de facto classification4. 
 
Table 1: Classification of Exchange Rate Regime 
Fixed Intermediate Floating 
De facto Classification by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenerger 
(1) Fixed (2) Crawling peg 
(3) Dirty floats 
(4) Float 
De facto Classification by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(1) No separate legal tender 
(2) Pre-announced peg or 
currency board arrangement 
(3) Pre-announced horizontal 
band that is narrower than or 
equal to ± 2% 
(4) De facto peg 
(5) Pre-announced crawling 
peg 
(6) Pre-announced crawling 
band that is narrower than or 
equal to ± 2% 
(7) De facto crawling peg 
(8) De facto crawling band that 
is narrower than or equal to ± 
2% 
(9) Pre-announced crawling 
band that is wide than or equal 
± 2% 
(10) De facto crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal 
to ± 5% 
(11) Moving band that is 
narrower than or equal to ± 2%   
(12) Managed floating 
(13) Freely floating 
(14) Freely falling 
(15) Hyperfloating 
De facto Classification by Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault 
(1) Currency boards 
(2) Single currency peg 
(3) Basket pegs 
(4) Crawling pegs with narrow 
bands 
(5) Flexibility index ≤ 1 
 
(6) Flexibility index ≥ 1 
 
De jure Classification by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(1) Pegged regimes (2) Intermediate regimes (4) Floating regimes 
 
Note: Inconclusive classifications from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger are not considered in our analysis.  
Sources: Bailliu et al. (2001); Bailliu et al. (2003); Ghosh et al. (2002); Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); and Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenergger (2005). 
 
 
                                               
3 This could be the results of measurement error in the classification of exchange rate arrangements. 
4 The de facto classification has the advantage of being based on observable behaviour, but it does not capture the 
distinction between stable nominal exchange rates resulting from the absence of shocks, and stability that stems from 
policy actions offsetting shocks. More importantly, it fails to reflect the commitment of the central bank to intervene in 
the foreign exchange market. Although the de jure classification captures this formal commitment, it falls short of 
capturing policies inconsistent with the commitment, which lead to a collapse or frequent adjustments of the parity. 
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In this article we employ a combination of three de facto and one de jure classifications. 
Firstly, we use the de facto classification developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger (2005), 
henceforth known as the "LYS classification". These authors apply a cluster analysis to a data 
set with three variables: changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these changes, 
and the volatility of international reserves from all IMF reporting countries in the period 1974-
2000. Secondly, the "natural classification" developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is 
employed. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) reclassified exchange rate regimes based on market 
determined dual and parallel exchange rates, and use official rates only if the exchange rates 
are unified5. These authors examine the chronologies of the exchange rate history for 153 
countries in the period 1946-2001. They are able to distinguish among floating by high inflation 
countries (freely falling) from floating by others. They define the category of "freely falling" rates 
when the 12-month rate of inflation exceeds 40% and when, during these periods of high 
inflation there is no official announcement of the regime by the authorities6. In addition, they 
define hyperfloats as those episodes of macroeconomic instability that are characterised by 
hyperinflation where the monthly inflation rate is 50% or more. Thirdly, an alternative 
classification scheme developed by Bailliu et al. (2001) is used. These authors develop a Hybrid 
Mechanical Rule (HMR) classification. This system classifies exchange rate regimes in terms of 
their observed flexibility and takes into account external shocks and revaluations. Their analysis 
is based on a sample of 60 countries for the period 1973-1998. Finally, the de jure classification 
from the IMF is used7. 
In our analysis all the different classifications are grouped into three broader regimes: 
fixed, intermediate and floating exchange rate regimes (see Table 1). Managed floating is 
classified under the floating category because managed, in the context of the Reinhart-Rogoff 
classification, does not necessarily imply active or frequent foreign exchange market 
intervention.  
 
2.2 Exchange Rate Arrangements and Speculative Attacks 
Earlier contributions to the theoretical literature on speculative attacks and currency 
crises pointed almost exclusively to deteriorating economic fundamentals as the trigger for 
speculative attacks. However, few studies have made an attempt to investigate empirically 
whether a particular exchange rate regime is more prone to a speculative attack. Some empirical 
research suggests that speculative attacks are more likely to occur under fixed or intermediate 
exchange regimes. Eichengreen et al. (1994) present an empirical analysis of speculative 
attacks on pegged exchange rates in 22 countries between 1967 and 1992. The authors define 
speculative attacks or crises as large movements in exchange rates, interest rates, and 
international reserves. They develop stylized facts concerning the univariate behavior of a 
variety of macroeconomic variables, comparing crises with periods of tranquility. For Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System observations they cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that there are few significant differences in the behavior of key macroeconomic 
variables between crises and non-crisis periods. On the contrary, a study developed by the IMF 
(1997), based on the IMF's de jure classifications, finds that close to half of the currency crashes 
(sharp changes in the exchange rate) occur under floating regimes, implying that crises can 
arise under both pegged and floating regimes8. Similarly, Ghosh et al. (2002) find that de jure 
                                               
5 In case where there are no dual or multiples rates or parallel markets are not active. 
6 In situations where the currency crisis marks a sudden transition from a fixed or quasi-fixed regime to a managed or 
independently floating regime, they label an exchange rate as freely falling during the six months immediately following 
a currency crisis. 
7 The data on the de jure classification of exchange rate regimes is taken from Ghosh et al. (2002) and from the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
8 An important observation is that many exchange rate regimes are improperly classified as flexible when they are in 
fact, pegged regimes. 
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pegged regimes have the lowest probability of a speculative attacks and therefore of a currency 
crisis9. Likewise, Falcetti and Tudela (2006) show that currency crises in developing and 
emerging markets are less frequent under de jure fixed exchange rates than under de jure 
flexible regimes in the period 1970-1997. On the other hand, Rogoff et al. (2003) find that 
currency crises tend to occur more frequently in de facto intermediate regimes especially in 
emerging markets. Similar conclusions are drawn by Peltonen (2006) who finds, using the de 
facto classification from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), that emerging markets with more rigid 
exchange rate regimes were less prone to speculative attacks and currency crises during the 
last two decades. Empirical case studies conducted by Jakubiak (2001) demonstrate that a 
floating exchange rate regime does not guarantee an emerging country avoiding a currency 
crisis. Haile and Pozo (2006), using the IMF's de jure and the LYS de facto classifications 
analyse the incidence of speculative attacks and currency crises in emerging markets according 
to the exchange regime in place between 1974 and 1998. Their results suggest that the de facto 
exchange regime plays no role in determining currency crisis period. As a consequence, fixed 
exchange regimes that are not truly fixed appear to invite speculation against the currency, 
increasing the likelihood of currency crisis. 
In the same way, Bubula and Otker-Rober (2003), using their own de facto 
classification10, find that pegged regimes, as a whole, are more prone to speculative attacks and 
currency crises compared with floating regimes, particularly for developed and emerging market 
economies that are integrated with international capital markets, in the period 1990-200111. On 
the contrary, Coulibaly (2009), using panel data of 192 countries from 1970 through 1999, and 
195 currency crisis episodes, examines the effect of membership in a currency union on the 
probability of experiencing a currency crisis. Both parametric and non-parametric estimates 
suggest that membership in a currency union reduces the likelihood of a speculative attacks or 
currency crash. Angkinand et al. (2009), using a logit model and a panel of 90 countries 
observed annually from 1990 to 2001, show that results from using Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
regime are that middle regimes such as adjustable parities, crawls, and moving bands are 
relatively prone to crises, while managed floats have the lowest probability of crises among 
intermediate regimes. However, when authors turn to LYS classification, they do not find any 
significant result in explaining the correlation between exchange rate regimes and currency 
crises. 
Esaka (2010a) examines the link between de facto exchange rate regimes and the 
incidence of currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001 using probit models. The author 
employs the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and finds no evidence that 
intermediate regimes have a significantly higher probability of speculative attacks and currency 
crises than both hard pegs and free floats. Similarly, Esaka (2010b) examines whether de facto 
exchange rate regimes affect the occurrence of currency crises in 84 countries over the 1980–
2001 period by using the probit model and the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004). His results show that pegged regimes significantly decrease the likelihood of speculative 
attacks and currency crises compared with floating regimes. On the other hand, Asici (2011) 
applied a multinomial logit framework to 163 developed and developing countries over the period 
from 1990 to 2007. His regression results suggest that countries experiencing speculative 
attacks and currency crisis are those that have chosen regimes inconsistent with their individual 
features. 
Karimi and Voia (2014) analyze the effect of exchange rate regimes and capital account 
liberalization policies on the occurrence of currency crises for 21 countries over the period of 
                                               
9 However, the impact of a currency crisis is more severe under pegged and intermediate regimes than under floating 
regimes. 
10 For details on this classification, see Bubula and Otker-Rober (2002). 
11 They define currency crises as episodes of severe market pressures, reflected by sharp movements in both 
exchange rates and interest rates. 
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1970-1998. The authors examine changes of the likelihood of currency crises under de jure IMF 
classification and two de facto exchange rate regimes (Reinhart and Rogoff and LYS). Their 
results show that the likelihood of speculative attacks and currency crises changes significantly 
under de facto regimes. While Reinhart and Rogoff based models show that fixed exchange 
rate arrangements are least susceptible to speculative attacks, LYS based models point to the 
intermediate exchange rate regimes as the least crisis prone. However, Esaka (2014), using 
data on currency crises and exchange rate regimes from 84 countries for the period of 1980–
1998 and the de jure IMF classification to identify official announced exchange rate regimes and 
the de facto Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification, evaluates the treatment effect of 
consistent pegs on the occurrence of currency crises to examine whether consistent pegs are 
indeed more prone to speculative attacks or currency crises than other regimes. Using matching 
estimators as a control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption, the author finds that 
countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of speculative attacks and 
currency crises than countries with other exchange rate policies. On the other hand, Ghosh et 
al. (2015) using the IMF de facto classification12 and a sample of 50 emerging economies over 
1980-2011, show that macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities are significantly greater under 
less flexible intermediate regimes, including hard pegs, as compared to floats. On the contrary, 
Combes et al. (2016) revisit the link between crises and exchange rate regimes. Using a panel 
of 90 developed and developing countries over the period 1980-2009, and two de facto 
classifications (the IMF de facto classification and the Ilzetski et al., 2010, classification). Their 
results reject that intermediate regimes are more vulnerable to crises compared to the hard peg 
and the fully floating regimes. 
3 The Exchange Market Pressure Indicator 
In any empirical analysis of currency crises, the first issue is to define the nature of a crisis. 
A currency crisis can be understood as a sudden decline in the confidence to an individual 
currency usually leading to a speculative attack against it. Since, in a currency crisis situation, a 
speculative attack may lead to sharp currency depreciation, an increase of interest rates and/or 
a substantial reserve loss, the most straightforward approach is to employ an index of 
speculative pressure13. This technique is common in the empirical literature on currency crises. 
The exchange market pressure indicator was originally developed by Girton and Roper (1977) 
to describe the composite behaviour of nominal exchange rates and international reserves, and 
later modified by Eichengreen et al. (1994, 1996). In the interest of measuring currency crises 
Eichengreen et al. (1994, 1996) add a third term: changes in the nominal interest rate. The idea 
behind this is that an excess demand for foreign exchange can be met through several channels. 
Depreciation or devaluation occurs if the speculative attack is successful, but monetary 
authorities may instead accommodate the pressure by running down their international reserves 
or deter the attack by raising interest rates. This methodology, which identifies currency crises 
using an exchange market pressure indicator, has been followed, in principle, by Sachs et al. 
                                               
12 Critics constantly moved away from the official International Monetary Fund classification to construct a de facto 
classification system in 1999. The new IMF classification combines the available information on exchange rates and 
monetary policy frameworks, and the formal or informal policy intentions of authorities, with data on actual exchange 
rates and reserve movements to reach an assessment of the actual exchange rate regime (Habermeier et al., 2009, 
provide information on revisions to this classification system in early 2009). However, it can be argued that the new 
IMF classification system is still one of the de jure regimes, since it still relies heavily on official information and looks 
mainly at the behaviour of official exchange rates (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). 
13 In theoretical literature, a currency crisis is mostly defined only in the case of fixed exchange rate regimes, usually 
as the official devaluation or abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime. However, this definition is not flexible 
enough to serve a use in empirical research, since many currencies are not formally pegged to a specific currency 
and many countries use various forms of floating exchange rate regimes. 
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(1996); Kaminsky et al. (1998); Tudela (2004); Peltonen (2006); Haile and Pozo (2006); Falcetti 
and Tudela (2006), among others. 
In this article, the exchange Market Pressure Indicator (MPI) is calculated as the weighted 
average of percentage changes in the exchange rate (e), percentage changes in the interest 
rate (i), and percentage changes in international reserves (r)14, using the United States as the 
country of reference15. The exchange market pressure index is defined as follows: 
𝑀𝑃𝐼 = 𝑤1∆𝑒 + 𝑤2∆𝑖 − 𝑤3∆𝑟                                                    (1)                      
where e represents the price of US$1 in domestic currency, i the interest rate, and r international 
reserves. Since the volatilities of foreign reserves, exchange rates and interest rates are very 
different, the weights w1, w2 and w3, attached to each component are used to equalise the 
volatilities of each of the three MPI components, thereby preventing any one of them from 
dominating the index, and are defined as the inverse of the standard deviation of each of the 
individual series. Formally: 
𝑤𝑗 =
1
𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑗
1
𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒
+
1
𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖
+
1
𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑟
                                                 (2) 
where j stands for any of the three variables and StDev stands for the standard deviation. 
According to equation (1), if a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, a speculative attack 
may lead to sharp currency devaluation, an increase of interest rates and/or a substantial foreign 
reserve loss. Contrary, if a country has a flexible exchange rate regime, a speculative attack 
may lead to sharp currency depreciation, and then to an increase of interest rates and/or a 
substantial international reserve loss, but only if monetary authorities want to deter the attack. 
The MPI is a continuous variable. 
4 Empirical Methodology 
A panel data model is used to estimate the impact of exchange rate regimes on the MPI. 
We employ MPI because a continuous variable generally contains more information than a 
discrete crisis dummy since this measure captures pressures which reflect the idiosyncrasy of 
the countries. The model used is a static panel data through Least Squares Dummy Variables 
(LSDV). The following equation describes the general specification used: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝐷𝑖𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                           (3) 
where i =1,2.....N,  t = 1,2....T, yit is the dependent variable in country i and time t,  Xit  is the 
vector of inputs for the i th variables in the t th period,  Di  is a dummy variable,  αi is a country 
specific effect and εit is an error term. We also assume εit ~ (0, σ2).  
The country specific effect, αi, is designed to capture the determinants of a country's 
speculative attack that are not already controlled by the other explanatory variables. It thus 
accounts for unobservable characteristics that vary across countries but not over time. The 
country specific effect could be either a fixed effect (i.e., a constant that varies for each cross-
sectional unit), or a random effect (i.e., a random variable drawn from a common distribution 
                                               
14 A decrease rather than increase in international reserves is used, since an increase in speculative pressure tends 
to increase the exchange rate and the interest rate, but tends to reduce foreign reserves. 
15 Variables in logarithms. 
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with a mean α and a variance σ2). We use a Hausman test to decide whether it is more 
appropriate to model the country effects as being fixed or random16. 
We employ a panel data estimating method to determine the impact of the exchange 
arrangement on exchange market pressure. The dependent variable is MPI. To ascertain that 
our results are robust to the regime classifications, we employ both de jure and de facto 
classifications in this article. We also use three different de facto classifications. 
5 The Data 
The sample consists of panel data for 125 countries classified by the World Bank according 
to their income. Advanced or developed countries are those economies classified as upper 
income countries. Emerging markets countries are defined according to the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) index17 at that moment. The rest of the countries are designated as 
developing. Table 2 provides a list of countries classified in each group. 
The data set is annual, spanning from 1974 through to 1999. Data availability differs across 
countries. Particularly, the data for East-European countries which starts from the 1990s.  
Most of the macroeconomic and financial variables used in our analysis are taken from the 
World Bank's World Development Indicators and the IMF's World Economic Outlook databases. 
A few series are taken from the CD-ROM version of the International Monetary Fund's 
International Financial Statistic (IFS). The data from the de jure IMF classification can be 
obtained from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
and Ghosh et al. (2002). For the Market Pressure Index (MPI) calculations, we employ total non-
gold international reserves, average period exchange rates and short-term interest rates. Money 
market rates were used for all the countries where available, and t-bill rates, bank lending or 
deposit rates otherwise; in a number of cases, discount rates were used, when no other interest 
rate data were available (see Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
16 The null hypothesis of the Hausman test in this context states that there is no correlation between country effects 
and explanatory variables. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that modelling country effects as fixed is more 
appropriate. 
17 The MSCI index classifies a country into an emerging market in line with a number of factors relating to 
international capital market access. 
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Table 2: List of Countries 
Advanced 
Countries 
Emerging  
Markets 
Developing  
Countries 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Kuwait 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Czech Republic 
Egypt 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Jordan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Rusia 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
Algeria 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameron 
Chad 
Congo, Rep. of 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Gabon 
Gambia, the 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Kazahstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao Dem. 
Rep. 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger  
Nigeria 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Romania 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Slovak Rep. 
Sri Lanka 
St. Lucia 
St. Kitt & Nevis 
St. Vicent & Grenadines 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Note: Emerging market economies are those that are included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
index. Advanced economies are those that are classified as upper income economies by the World Bank, with the 
exception of Israel, which is in an emerging market. The remaining countries were designated as developing countries. 
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Table 3: Interest Rate Used for the Corresponding Countries 
Money Market T-bill Bank Lending Bank Deposit Discount 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Brazil 
Canada 
Croatia 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Finland 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Latvia 
Luxembourg 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Russia 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Zimbabwe 
Belgium 
France 
Guyana 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lesotho 
Moldova 
Romania 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Dominica 
El Salvador 
Er. Guinea 
Estonia 
Gabom 
Grenada 
Honduras 
Israel 
Liberia 
Macedonia 
Nigeria 
Panama 
Poland 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & Grenadines 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Zambia 
Algeria 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Dominican Rep. 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Lao Dem. Rep. 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Nicaragua 
Saudi Arabia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chad 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. of 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
India 
Ivory coast 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Malawi 
Mali 
Malta 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Niger 
Peru 
Portugal 
Senegal 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Venezuela 
 
Notes: Money Market is the rate on short-term lending between financial institutions. Treasury bill rate is the rate at 
which short-term securities are issued or traded in the market. Lending rate is the bank rate that usually meets the 
short- and medium-term financing needs of the private sector. This rate is normally differentiated according to the 
creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. Deposit rate usually refers to rates offered to resident 
customers for demand, time or saving deposits. Discount rate is the rate at which the central banks lend or discount 
eligible paper for deposit money banks, typically shown on an end-of-period basis. 
 
The variables used in this analysis and their descriptions are listed in Table 4. These 
variables were selected on the basis of previous theoretical and empirical literature. Government 
balance is defined as current and capital revenue and official grants received, less total 
expenditure and lending minus repayments. This variable considers central governments only. 
Short-term debt is defined as debt that has an original maturity of one year or less. Available 
data does not permit a distinction between public and private non-guaranteed short-term debt. 
The ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets is the ratio of domestic currency holding and 
deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other governments, nonfinancial public 
enterprises, the private sector, and other banking institutions. Money and quasi money are 
defined as the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central 
government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than 
the central government. This definition of money supply is frequently called M2. Foreign direct 
investment is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and 
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short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Current account balance is the sum of 
the credits less the debits arising from international transactions in goods, service, income, and 
current transfers. Unemployment refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. International reserves are the sum of a country's 
monetary authorities’ holdings of special drawing rights, its reserve position in the IMF, its 
holdings of foreign exchange, and its holdings of gold. Variables expressed in US dollar were 
converted to the natural logarithmic scale. The rest of variables were expressed in percentage. 
Finally, floating and intermediate exchange rate regimes are identified with a dummy variable 
that received the value of one in which these regimes prevail in a country in a particular year.  
 
Table 4: List of variables used in the estimations 
Variable Description 
Gov. Balance 
Stdebratio 
Debt 
Domfin 
Debtsx 
Bnkres 
Dcrep 
M2gdp 
M2res 
Resdebt 
Resimp 
Fdigni 
Cagni 
Inflation 
Unempl 
Usirate 
Reserves 
Per capita GDP 
Real GDP 
Openness 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Central government balance (% of GDP) 
Short-term debt/Total debt (%) 
Total debt/GNI (%) 
Domestic financing, total (% of GDP) 
Debt service/Exports of goods and services (%) 
Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets (%) 
Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) 
Money and quasi money (% GDP) 
Money and quasi money (% Reserves) 
Reserves/Total debt (%) 
Reserves/Imports of goods and services (%) 
Foreign direct investment (% of GNI) 
Current account balance (% GDP) 
The consumer price index (%) 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) 
USA short-term interest rate (%) 
International reserves (US$) 
Per capita real GDP growth (%) 
Real GDP growth (%) 
Exports plus imports of goods and services (% GDP) 
Dummy variable capturing float exchange rate regimes 
Dummy variable capturing intermediate arrangements 
 
Notes: The table does not include the dependent variable, which is explained in the text. Variables expressed in US 
dollars were converted to the natural logarithmic scale for the purpose of estimation. 
6 Estimation Results 
This section presents the results of regressions for the Least Squares Dummy Variables 
(LSDV) models. The LSDV models estimated are an unbalanced panel with robust standard 
errors. To test which exchange arrangements are also associated with more foreign exchange 
market pressure, we regress the exchange Market Pressure Indicator (MPI) developed in 
Section 3 on macroeconomic and financial variables. Independent variables are selected on the 
basis of observations on theoretical and empirical literature. These independent variables are 
per capita GDP growth, government balance as a percentage of GDP, the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP (Openness), the ratio of short-term debt to total debt (Stdebtratio), the ratio of 
domestic financing to GDP (Domfin), the ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets (Bnkres), 
the ratio of total debt to Gross National Income (Debt), the ratio of reserves to total debt 
(Resdebt), the ratio of reserves to imports of goods and services (Resimp), international 
reserves, the ratio of debt service to export of goods and services (Debtsx), current account 
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balance (Cagni), the ratio of broad money to GDP (M2gdp), the ratio of money and quasi money 
to foreign reserves (M2res), the ratio of domestic credit to private sector relative to GDP (Dcrep), 
the US interest rate (Usirate), inflation, total unemployment (Unempl), and foreign direct 
investment to GNI (Fdigni). In addition to these explanatory variables, we include a dummy 
variable to account for the nature of the exchange rate regime and dropped fixed regimes18. The 
vulnerability to crisis is represented by the ratio of total debt to Gross National Income; ratio of 
reserves to total debt; ratio of reserves to imports of goods and services; international reserves; 
and ratio of debt service to export of goods and services. Current account balance has also 
been used as a proxy for macroeconomic conditions and vulnerability to crisis. In addition, the 
ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP is used like a proxy to financial sector development. Per 
capita GDP growth is a measure of the level of economic development. 
The expected sign for the coefficient of per capita GDP growth is negative, because an 
increasing rate of growth may generate a rise in the domestic asset markets, attracting capital 
inflows and, therefore, supporting the currency. Conversely, a decline in per capita GDP growth 
leads to an increase in the foreign exchange market pressure and the probability of currency 
crises. Similarly, an increase in fiscal deficit (or decline in the government balance as a 
percentage of GDP) may generate a rise in the probability of currency crises. 
On the other hand, we expect a positive sign in coefficients of the ratio of short-term debt 
to total debt, the ratio of total debt to Gross National Income and the ratio of debt service to 
export of goods and services because grater external debt increases the pressure in the foreign 
exchange market and the probability of a currency crisis. Also, we expect a negative sign in 
coefficients of the ratio of reserves to total debt. Moreover, for some variables of financial sector 
development we expect a positive sign (the ratio of domestic financing to GDP, the ratio of broad 
money to GDP, the ratio money and quasi money to foreign reserves and the ratio of domestic 
credit to private sector to GDP) particularly because an expansion of domestic credit increases 
the likelihood of a speculative attack (Krugman's effect)19, while for the ratio of bank liquid 
reserves to bank assets we expect a negative sign. In addition, increases in foreign reserves 
reduce the probability of speculative attacks and currency crises. Also, an import growth 
increases in advance of a speculative attack, then the expected sign on the ratio of reserves to 
imports of goods and services is negative. In the same way, the expected sign on trade 
openness is negative since more open economies are less likely to suffer a currency crisis, the 
benefits of trade openness outweigh the high vulnerability to external shocks. A positive balance 
in the current account reduces the probability of a currency crisis. 
Foreign direct investment helps to add a productive capacity to the economy, because this 
type of capital flows goes directly to real investment in plants, equipment and infrastructure. 
Hence, we expect a negative sign in the ratio of foreign direct investment to GNI. On the contrary, 
US interest rates can be related to currency crises, because higher US interest rates attract 
capital outflows and increase the likelihood to suffer a speculative attack particularly in emerging 
and developing economies. Similarly, high inflation increases the likelihood of exit into a currency 
crisis. Hence the expected sign is positive20. Equally, a high unemployment rate increases the 
vulnerability to currency crises, because a slump in economic activity, reflected in the rise of 
unemployment, makes the central bank more attentive to domestic objectives, compromising 
the exchange rate target. 
                                               
18 The dummy takes the value 1 if the exchange rate regime prevails in a country in a particular year; otherwise, it is 
assigned a value of zero. 
19 The model developed by Krugman (1979) suggests that, prior to a crisis, there will be a rapid growth of domestic 
credit relative to the demand for money, possibly in response to a need to finance the public sector. As such, credit to 
the public sector and fiscal imbalances could serve as a precursor to a crisis. 
20 Kumar et al. (2003) suggest that high inflation can increase vulnerability to crises through an impact on resource 
allocation, competitiveness, and macroeconomic stability. Also, Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) and Tudela (2004) 
find that inflation explains currency crises rather well. 
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Following the approach developed by Bird and Mandilaras (2006) we select a combination 
of fundamentals that best explains the MPI in each group of countries. We estimate our LSDV 
model including all the above-mentioned variables simultaneously (not reported), but 
insignificant variables were gradually eliminated, until the most parsimonious representation of 
the data was achieved21. Using the Hausman test we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the country effects and the explanatory variables in most of cases at a 1% level (see 
Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Hausman Specification Test 
Classification All Countries Advanced Emerging Developing 
Natural          χ2 (9) = 78.4(0.00) χ2 (6) = 24.5(0.00) χ2 (11) = 37.1(0.00) χ2 (6) = 12.4(0.01) 
LYS      χ2 (9) = 80.2(0.00)  χ2 (6) = 18.0(0.01) χ2 (11) = 29.0(0.00) χ2 (6) = 23.4(0.00) 
HMR            χ2 (9) = 81.1(0.00)  χ2 (6) = 22.7(0.00) χ2 (11) = 26.9(0.00) χ2 (6) = 16.8(0.01) 
De Jure          χ2 (9) = 67.6(0.00)  χ2 (6) = 20.5(0.00)  χ2 (11) = 52.4(0.00)  χ2 (6) = 16.2(0.01) 
        Source: Author's calculations. 
 
The main results for exchange market pressure indicators are summarized in Tables 6 and 
7. The signs of our indicators are mostly as expected. Regarding individual indicators, we find 
that exchange market pressure increases along with the ratio of domestic credit to private sector 
to GDP, the ratio of debt service to export of goods and services, the ratio of domestic financing 
to GDP and inflation. On the contrary, it increases in the rest of the explanatory variables 
associated with a lower foreign exchange market pressure.  
On the other hand, the impact of exchange arrangements on foreign exchange market 
pressure is analysed we find that there are positive and significant associations between foreign 
exchange market pressure and floating and intermediate exchange regimes in most 
classifications. Fixed regimes show the best performance against an increase in the foreign 
exchange market pressure, particularly in developing countries. 
In emerging and developing countries intermediate exchange rate regimes are more prone 
to increase the foreign exchange market pressure in most classifications. However, when we 
use natural classification in emerging countries, floating regimes show a positive and statistically 
significant impact on exchange market pressure as its coefficient is bigger than under fixed and 
intermediate regimes. Similarly, floating regimes present the worst performance when we use 
the HMR classification in developing countries (see Table 8).  
We identified certain emerging and developing countries which kept floating exchange rate 
regime, both de jure and de facto, when speculative attacks and respective currency crises 
occurred. These countries are Czech Republic in 1997; Ecuador in 1982; Georgia in 1998, 
Ghana in 1992; Guatemala in 1990; Guinea-Bissau in 1996; Honduras in 1993; Jamaica in 
1992; Lebanon in 1986; Madagascar in 1994; Nigeria in 1986 and 1992; Paraguay in 1992; 
South Africa in 1982 and 1996, among others.  
 
 
 
                                               
21 However, in some cases the dummy variables of exchange rates were statistically not significant but they are not 
excluded. 
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Table 6: The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on MPI in  
All Countries and Advanced Economies 
 All Countries Advanced Economies 
Natural LYS HMR De jure Natural LYS HMR De jure 
Constant 4.28 
(1.39) 
8.13 
(2.61)* 
9.69 
(2.68)* 
7.26 
(2.72)* 
0.87 
(0.82) 
-1.25 
(-0.54) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
-0.41 
(-0.35) 
Per cap. GDP -0.32 
(-2.97)* 
-0.31 
(-3.32)* 
-0.61 
(-2.52)# 
-0.37 
(-3.52)* 
-0.17 
(-2.43)# 
-0.29 
(-1.77)# 
-0.31 
(-2.53)# 
-0.16 
(-2.27)# 
Gov. balance -0.30 
(-2.62)* 
-0.45 
(-2.69)* 
-0.33 
(-1.26) 
-0.34 
(-2.87)* 
    
Dcrep 0.21 
(2.91)* 
0.22 
(3.36)* 
0.27 
(2.73)* 
0.21 
(3.02)* 
0.03 
(2.52)# 
0.05 
(2.60)* 
0.03 
(2.58)# 
0.03 
(2.83)* 
Resimp -0.25 
(-5.37)* 
-0.33 
(-5.29)* 
-0.39 
(-5.19)* 
-0.27 
(-5.51)* 
-0.13 
(-4.97)* 
-0.13 
(-3.98)* 
-0.14 
(-4.87)* 
-0.13 
(-5.11)* 
Resdebt 0.05 
(3.75)* 
0.06 
(3.15)* 
0.10 
(2.73)* 
0.05 
(3.85)* 
    
Inflation 0.01 
(3.04)* 
0.004 
(1.25) 
0.01 
(4.85)* 
0.01 
(3.21)* 
0.13 
(2.26)# 
0.15 
(1.54) 
0.14 
(2.33)# 
0.13 
(2.01)# 
Openness -0.09 
(-4.91)* 
-0.12 
(-5.05)* 
-0.16 
(-3.92)* 
-0.12 
(-5.76)* 
    
Floating 6.48 
(4.27)* 
2.51 
(1.74)^ 
11.11 
(1.12) 
1.95 
(1.12) 
-0.08 
(-0.10) 
-0.43 
(-0.42) 
0.55 
(0.55) 
0.81 
(0.68) 
Intermediate 2.53 
(1.65)^ 
5.81 
(3.06)* 
4.91 
(3.73)* 
4.76 
(2.21)# 
-1.20 
(-1.86)^ 
-0.35 
(-0.32) 
-0.45 
(-0.48) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Observations 1370 1168 706 1345 581 418 472 581 
F-test prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.21 0.17 0.30 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.13 
 
Notes: The table reports least squares dummy variables results of unbalance panels with fixed effects. The dependent 
variable is MPI. The standard errors of the estimates are robust to cross contemporaneous correlation.  t -statistics 
are displayed in brackets. (*) denote significance at the 1 per cent level, (#) at the 5 per cent and (^) at the 10 per cent 
level. 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
To conclude, our results yield positive and significant associations between floating and 
intermediate regimes and exchange market pressure, particularly in emerging and developing 
countries. As a consequence, fixed arrangements are less likely to generate pressure in the 
foreign exchange market. These results are similar to findings by Jakubiak (2001); Ghosh et al. 
(2002); Peltonen (2006); Falcetti and Tudela (2006); Haile and Pozo (2006); Esaka (2010b); 
Karimi and Voia (2014) and Esaka (2014).  
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Table 7: The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on MPI in  
Emerging and Developing Countries 
 Emerging Economies Developing Countries 
Natural LYS HMR De jure Natural LYS HMR De jure 
Constant 11.95 
(1.91)^ 
15.63 
(2.40)# 
11.54 
(2.51)# 
14.03 
(2.17)# 
-2.86 
(-1.88)^ 
-2.13 
(-1.22) 
-0.35 
(-0.07) 
-2.21 
(-1.43) 
Per cap. GDP -1.03 
(-3.47)* 
-1.08 
(-2.85)* 
-0.79 
(-1.73)^ 
-1.17 
(-3.60)* 
    
Gov. balance 0.76 
(1.82)^ 
0.14 
(0.26) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
0.50 
(1.04) 
-0.45 
(-2.58)* 
-0.33 
(-1.96)# 
-0.91 
(-1.67)^ 
-0.46 
(-2.76)* 
Dcrep 0.22 
(3.40)* 
0.26 
(3.62)* 
0.28 
(4.64)* 
0.23 
(3.60)* 
    
Domfin 1.35 
(2.60)* 
1.59 
(2.50)# 
0.78 
(0.80) 
1.32 
(2.12)# 
    
Resimp 0.43 
(-4.53)* 
-0.56 
(-4.22)* 
-0.41 
(-5.38)* 
-0.45 
(-4.98)* 
-0.06 
(-2.53)# 
-0.10 
(-2.81)* 
-0.28 
(-3.79)* 
-0.07 
(-2.88)* 
Resdebt 0.15 
(2.30)# 
0.13 
(2.65)* 
0.12 
(2.59)# 
0.12 
(2.33)# 
0.01 
(1.07) 
-0.03 
(-1.85)^ 
0.06 
(1.62) 
0.01 
(1.56) 
Debt -0.94 
(-2.49)# 
-0.81 
(-1.82)^ 
-0.25 
(-0.80) 
-0.50 
(-1.29) 
    
Debtsx     0.14 
(1.99)# 
0.17 
(2.57)# 
0.16 
(1.17) 
0.14 
(2.15)# 
Inflation 0.01 
(0.96) 
0.001 
(0.67) 
0.06 
(4.04)* 
0.01 
(1.08) 
    
Openness -0.12 
(-2.65)* 
-0.12 
(-2.16)# 
-0.22 
(-4.80)* 
-0.13 
(-2.33)# 
    
Floating 19.40 
(3.50)* 
4.42 
(1.65)^ 
-3.68 
(-0.47) 
2.57 
(0.47) 
2.01 
(0.82) 
3.31 
(2.36)# 
15.82 
(3.79)* 
1.60 
(1.35) 
Intermediate 5.66 
(2.63)* 
6.81 
(1.81)^ 
7.43 
(3.88)* 
7.93 
(2.07)# 
1.51 
(1.24) 
5.18 
(2.46)# 
1.83 
(1.71)^ 
2.15 
(1.08) 
Observations 388 318 261 377 1210 1021 437 1191 
F-test prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.30 0.28 0.53 0.29 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.06 
 
Notes: The table reports least squares dummy variables results of unbalance panels with fixed effects. The dependent 
variable is MPI. The standard errors of the estimates are robust to cross contemporaneous correlation.  t -statistics 
are displayed in brackets. (*) denote significance at the 1 per cent level, (#) at the 5 per cent and (^) at the 10 per cent 
level. 
 
Source: Author's estimates. 
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Table 8: Exchange Arrangements Performance on Exchange Market Pressure 
Indicator 
 Natural LYS HMR De Jure 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranking from the best to 
the worst performance 
All Countries 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate 
Advanced Economies 
Intermediate 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating* 
Emerging Economies 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate 
Developing Countries 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate* 
 
Note: (*) insignificant variables. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
The academic debate on the most appropriate exchange rate regime for a country or group 
of countries has been one of the most controversial topics in theoretical and empirical literature. 
Notwithstanding its increasing relevance to policy, the literature offers relatively few empirical 
studies about the impact of the exchange rate regime on a speculative attacks and currency 
crisis in developed, emerging and developing countries, separately. In this article we distinguish 
between the de jure and the three de facto classifications system. We have used the IMF de 
jure classification and checked the robustness of our results with three different de facto 
classifications: the LYS classification based on a clustered analysis, the natural classification 
based mainly on market determined dual and parallel exchange rates, and the HMR 
classification based on exchange rate regimes and taking into account external shocks and 
revaluations.  
We have used a least squares dummy variables regression technique to study whether a 
particular exchange rate regime affects the experience of more foreign exchange market 
pressure. Our empirical findings indicate clear support for fixed regimes. Countries with fixed 
exchange rate arrangements are associated with significantly lower exchange market pressures 
than countries with floating or intermediate exchange rate regimes. In emerging and developing 
countries the intermediate exchange rate regimes are more prone to increase the foreign 
exchange market pressure in most classifications. Emerging countries using de jure 
intermediate exchange rate regimes show an exchange market pressure rate of 79.3% bigger 
than emerging countries using de jure fixed regimes. 
In light of these results, it can be concluded that a fixed exchange rate arrangement 
provides lower foreign exchange market pressure and lower probability of currency crises. An 
important part of literature considers adopting a foreign currency (dollarization) as the domestic 
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currency to buy a credible policy of price stability, eliminate the role of short-run discretionary 
government policies that can give rise to policy inconsistencies and avoid speculative attacks 
and currency crises.  
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